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GRANTING AN AUTOMATIC
AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY
RESPONSE: PROTECTING NATIONAL
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM
CYBERATTACK
INTRODUCTION

T

he Internet enables people to easily communicate across
the world and freely share files, photos, and videos without geographical limitation. It has undoubtedly become essential to all modern countries in the world; it is at the cornerstone
of and controls commerce, government activities, energy production and distribution, water treatment, mass transit, and
emergency services. 1 However, the Internet’s connectedness
and openness have also allowed anyone to anonymously launch
cyberattacks and inflict damage upon another country without
physical limitation.2 From hundreds of miles away and using
only a laptop computer,3 states and non-state actors4 alike can
attack another nation’s critical infrastructure5—including sys1. See ANDRE COLARIK, CYBER TERRORISM: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS vii–xii (2006).
2. See THOMAS WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 21–22 (2000).
3. See Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma
of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2
(2009).
4. In this Note, unless specified otherwise, “state” refers to a nation. A
non-state actor refers to an individual or an entity that is not affiliated or
under the control of a nation’s government.
5. Critical infrastructure are those “systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, [and] national public health or safety.” 42 U.S.C. §
5195c(e); Major Sean Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 404, 406 (2007) (“Critical
infrastructure includes the following sectors: agriculture, food, water, public
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information
and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.”); National
Strategy for Homeland Security, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 29–30
(2002), available at http://www.ncs.gov/library/policy_docs/nat_strat_hls.pdf
[hereinafter National Strategy].
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tems that are vital to national security such as sectors controlling energy, transportation, food, public health, and chemical
industry 6 —instantaneously causing disastrous effect to the
targeted nation and its citizens.7
In recent years, several episodes have scratched at the surface of such disastrous possibilities. In 2007, the Russian government allegedly launched a series of cyberattacks8 on Estonia, which essentially paralyzed the entire country; the attacks
affected Estonia’s commercial banks, media outlets, and government websites.9 In 2009, Georgia also came under cyberattack, resulting in the shutdown of Georgia’s government and
commercial websites.10 Just a year later, in 2010, a sophisticated virus known as Stuxnet infiltrated and significantly impaired an Iranian uranium enrichment plant by sabotaging the
plant’s centrifuges.11 Stuxnet had the capacity to attack computer networks that controlled “oil pipelines, electronic utilities, nuclear facilities, and other industrial sites.”12 The most
significant, and alarming, aspect of the Stuxnet episode is that
the initial attacker spread the virus information across the
world, and its secrets are now available to anyone who seeks

6. See Condron, supra note 5, at 406; National Strategy, supra note 5 at
29–30.
7. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18–20.
8. In this Note, “cyberattack” refers to “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy
computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them.”
Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future
of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011).
9. See Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data
Siege
in
Estonia,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?scp=1&sq=est
onia,%20russians&st=Search; see also Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the
(Aug.
21,
2007),
Most
Wired
Country
in
Europe,
WIRED
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/1509/ff_estonia?currentPage=5.
10. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace:
An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F.
L. REV. 43, 46 (2009).
11. David E. Sanger, Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran.html?scp=8&sq
=stuxnet&st=cse [hereinafter Iran Fights Malware].
12. Id.
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them. As a result, anyone can download Stuxnet, redesign the
code, and launch it to against a new target.13
The United States is especially vulnerable to cyberattack,
partly due to the fact that its information and electronic networks of military, public, and private sectors are interconnected.14 Moreover, some of the United States’ adversaries already
possess the ability to directly attack one of the United States’
critical infrastructure sectors via cyberattack, and America
may not be prepared for such attack.15 On May 12, 2011, two
years after President Obama released Cyberspace Policy Review, a comprehensive review of the federal government’s efforts and strategy in protecting the nation’s information and
communication infrastructure, 16 the Obama Administration
unveiled a Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, a non-binding
set of regulations the Obama Administration composed in order
to improve the security of the nation’s network and infrastructure,17 and submitted it to Capitol Hill.18 One of the purposes of

13. John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. Times (Sept.
26,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?scp=5&sq=stux
net&st=cse [hereinafter A Silent Attack].
14. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBER K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 226–27 (2010).
15. 60 Minutes: Former Chief of National Intelligence Says U.S. Unprepared for Cyber Attack (CBS television broadcast Nov. 8, 2009) (Transcript
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/06/60minutes/main5555565.shtml)
(In a 2009 interview with 60 Minutes, Admiral Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, opined that the United States’ adversaries
have the capability to bring down a power grid via cyberattack, and stated
that “[the] United States is not prepared for such an attack.”).
16. White House, Cyberpolicy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient
Information
and
Communications
Infrastructure,
(May
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fina
l.pdf (“But with the broad reach of a loose and lightly regulated digital infrastructure, great risks threaten nations, private enterprises, and individual
rights. The government has a responsibility to address these strategic vulnerabilities to ensure that the United States and its citizens, together with
the larger community of nations, can realize the full potential of the information technology revolution.”).
(May
12,
2011),
17. Cybersecurity
Proposal,
WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/lawenforcement-provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf [hereinafter
Cybersecurity Proposal].
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the Proposal was to “protect our national security by addressing threats to our power grids, water systems, and other critical infrastructure.”19
In order to address the growing threat of cyberattacks, there
have been efforts to create international agreements to regulate cyberspace, to analogize the issue of cyberattacks to current international law, and even to ban cyber weapons.20 However, these efforts have not been successful and are not adequate to address the danger of cyberattacks on national critical
infrastructure.21 Scholars argue that any international treaty
regarding cyberspace will be insufficient and nearly impossible
to enforce,22 and it is unclear whether the current international
legal regime can govern cyberattacks.23 Making matters more
difficult, and the current international efforts even less adequate, is the attribution problem;24 due to the anonymity aspect

18. Howard A. Schmidt, The Administration Unveils Its Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/12/administration-unveils-itscybersecurity-legislative-proposal.
19. Id.
20. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185, 2296
U.N.T.S. 123 (In 2001, the Council of Europe drafted and adopted Convention
on Cybercrime, the first international treaty seeking to address crimes in
cyberspace) [hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime]; see also Todd Leaven &
Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 15–22 (2010) (describing the debate over establishment of international agreement regarding
cyberattacks); see also Waxman, supra note 8, at 426 (examining the challenge of addressing cyberattacks by using Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United
Nations Charter).
21. See Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J.
373, 391 (2011); see also Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 19–20; Scott J.
Shackelford, Article: From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 216–18 (2009);
22. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 23–24; see also Hollis, supra
note 21, at 392–93.
23. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 427 (stating that Charter Article 2(4)’s
prohibition of use of force is difficult to interpret); see also Hollis, supra note
21, at 393 (“First, states must not launch (or threaten) a cyberattack that
qualifies as a use of force . . . . This prohibition is vague in its particulars.”).
24. Attribution refers to the ability to trace back to the original machine,
actor, or entity that initiated the cyberattack. David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531, 531–32 (2011).
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of the basic architectural structure of the Internet, it is difficult
to pinpoint the original initiator of a cyberattack.25
Although international treaties regulating cyberspace may be
ineffective, to most effectively protect national critical infrastructure against cyberattacks, an international agreement is
needed that will authorize a nation that has been cyberattacked to respond with military action. Part I of this Note provides a background to explain the immediacy and the potential
disastrous effect of a cyberattack to a country’s critical infrastructure. Part II discusses the attribution problem of cyberspace and its effect on regulation of cyberattacks. Part III explains possible response measures under the current international law, argues the inadequacy of current international law,
and explores the difficulty of establishing a future, hypothetical
international legal regime regarding cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure. Finally, Part IV proposes an international
agreement that will grant automatic authority for a nation to
respond with a military action against a state 26 that has
launched a cyberattack upon the nation’s critical infrastructure, and explains how the proposed agreement will also minimize the attribution problem. Furthermore, Part IV elucidates
the need for such agreement, its effectiveness, and nations’ incentives to join the proposed international agreement.
I. BACKGROUND: IMMEDIACY AND THE POTENTIALLY
DISASTROUS EFFECTS OF A CYBERATTACK ON NATIONAL
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Types, Purposes, and Impacts of a Cyberattack
A foreign state or a non-state actor can use different types of
cyberattacks against another nation to achieve different purposes. There are largely three categories of cyberattacks: Internet-delivered malicious software,27 denial-of-service (“DOS”)
25. For a detailed explanation, see id. at 542–44; see also Hollis, supra note
21, at 397–98.
26. The proposed international agreement will grant an injured state authority to respond with military action against any state that has launched a
cyberattack on its critical infrastructure, or against a state from which a nonstate entity has launched a cyberattack, regardless of whether the government authorized the attack.
27. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 13–14. For further information, see Major
John S. Fredland, Building a Better Cybersecurity Act: Empowering the Exec-
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attacks, 28 and “unauthorized remote intrusion into computer
systems by individuals.” 29 The Internet-delivered malicious
software, more commonly known as “malware,” affects computer systems by infecting e-mails, exploiting vulnerable engines,
and visiting infected websites. 30 The denial-of-service attack
targets a computer system, and overwhelms it with information until it seizes and can no longer function.31 The most
severe form of DOS attack is a distributed-denial-of-service
(“DDoS”) attack because, in addition to shutting down computer systems, it can make the system more vulnerable to other
forms of attacks by affecting the system’s defenses.32 The individual remote intrusion involves unauthorized access to a computer system by an attack, 33 which enables the attacker to
harm the system in any number of ways.34
A state or a non-state actor can use these different types of
cyberattacks to perform a variety of tasks: from stealing someone’s identity to illegally extracting classified data.35 A cyberattack that extracts confidential information can result in loss of
millions of dollars. For example, in 2007, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation estimated that cyberattacks caused an average
financial loss of $167,713 per attack and “over $400 billion in
damages in the United States.”36 Not long after, during a 2009
speech, President Obama stated that in 2008 alone cyber criminals stole intellectual property worth up to one trillion dollars
from businesses around the world. 37 More recently, in 2010,
Google, and more than thirty other U.S. companies, suffered

utive Branch Against Cybersecurity Emergencies, 206 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10–13
(2010).
28. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 13–14; see also Fredland, supra note 27, at 10.
29. Id.
30. RICK LEHTINEN ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 3–21 (2d ed. 2006).
31. Id. at 81.
32. COLARIK, supra note 1, at 103.
33. Id. at 94.
34. See id. at 84.
35. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 536–42.
36. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18 n.95 (citing CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV.,
RL32114,
BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME,
AND
CYBERTERRORISM:
VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 27–29 (2008)).
37. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by
the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarksby-the-president-on-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure).
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cyberattacks that illegally downloaded intellectual property
data from the companies’ computer networks.38
In addition to attacking individuals or private companies,
cyberattack’s severity can elevate to the matter of national security. A cyberattack can “pry into a state’s public, sensitive
and classified computers . . . to manipulate data; to deceive decision makers; to influence public opinion; and even to cause
physical destruction from remote locations abroad.”39 As noted
above, Georgia and Estonia experienced firsthand the effect
that a cyberattack can have on their national security, and the
United States has also suffered national security breaches from
cyberattacks. For instance, in 2008, there was a breach in the
U.S. military computer network when an unknown person inserted a flash drive to a military laptop; the malware inside the
flash drive stole a great amount of classified information.40 On
July 4, 2009, a DDoS attack affected a number of U.S. and
South Korean government websites.41 Specifically, the attacks
shut down the U.S. Secret Service website, including its Treasury and Transportation Departments pages, 42 and South Korea’s Blue House,43 Defense Ministry, and National Assembly
websites. 44 Cyberattacks such as these, attempting to steal
classified national security information and to shut down government websites, still continue and are not likely to stop anytime soon.45

38. John Markoff et al., In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy Deterrent,
TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2010),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/26cyber.html?scp=1&sq=in%20digi
tal%20combat,%20u.s.%20finds%20no%20easy%20deterrent&st=cse.
39. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 17–18 (quoting WINGFIELD, supra note 2, at
21–22).
40. Waxman, supra note 8, at 444.
41. Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Cyberattacks Jam Government and
Commercial Websites in U.S. and South Korea, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/technology/09cyber.html?scp=1&sq=cybe
rattacks%20jam&st=cse.
42. Id.
43. Blue House is South Korea’s equivalent of the White House.
44. Sang-Hun & Markoff, supra note 41.
45. General Keith Alexander, the Director of National Security Agency,
stated that, in 2010 the Department of Defense alone was subject to “hundreds and thousands” of cyberattack attempts everyday. Steven G. Bradbury,
The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 591, 592 (2011).
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B. Potential Impact of a Cyberattack on National Critical Infrastructure
Although cyberattacks can have a variety of negative impacts
on national security, scholars believe that the most dangerous
attacks are those against a nation’s critical infrastructure.46 A
direct cyberattack to a nation’s critical infrastructure will “likely result in significant loss of life, as well as economic and social degradation.” 47 Citizens’ confidence in their government
will decline dramatically, and the rise in the level of fear
among citizens will “impact the basic social fabric.”48 According
to Richard Clarke, the former Chair of the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, a successful cyberattack on
vulnerabilities in the U.S. critical infrastructure will likely be
disastrous: “Transportation systems could grind to halt. Electronic power and natural gas system[s] could malfunction.
Manufacturing could freeze. 911 Emergency call centers could
jam. Stock, bond, futures, and banking transactions could be
jumbled . . . our forces [will be] at great risk by having their
logistics system fail.”49 As Clarke has eluded, the days when a
cyberattack could result in the mere theft of documents seem to
be over.
C. Emergence of Stuxnet and Future Cyberattack on Critical
Infrastructure
The danger of a cyberattack on national critical infrastructure increases as the complexity and sophistication of cyberattacks advance. Cybersecurity experts and analysts widely be-

46. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 18 n.95; see Timothy Shimeall et al., Countering Cyber War, 49 NATO REV. 16, 17–18 (Winter 2001/2002), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/0104-en.pdf; see also, Rebecca C. E.
McFadyen, Protecting the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure: Is the Department of
Homeland Security Our Nation’s Savior or the Albatross Around Our Neck?, 5
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 319, 342 (2009).
47. Shimeall, supra note 46, at 17.
48. Id. at 18 (describing the likely results of a cyberattack on different pillars of a nation’s critical infrastructure).
49. Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing Our Nation in Critical Infrastructure Protection: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform H.R.,
108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Richard Clark, Special Advisor, United
States National Security Council).
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lieve that Stuxnet50 was responsible for destroying one-fifth of
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges in 2010.51 When Stuxnet first surfaced in 2009, experts described it as “the most sophisticated
cyberweapon ever developed.”52 The Stuxnet malware that attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities appears to have included
two major components: the first component was designed to
spin Iran’s nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control, and the
second component “secretly recorded what normal operations
at the nuclear plant looked like, then played those readings
back to plant operators, like a pre-recorded security tape in a
bank heist, so that it would appear that everything was operating normally while the centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.”53 The program was successful, and the engineers
and officials of the Iranian nuclear facilities did not notice that
Stuxnet was sabotaging their nuclear facilities.54
What separates Stuxnet from previous viruses and malwares
used for cyberattack is that it had the ability to “jump from
50. Cybersecurity experts widely believe that Israel and the United States
were behind the development, testing, and eventual launch of Stuxnet in order to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program development. See Iran Fights Malware,
supra note 11; see also Times Topics: Stuxnet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malw
are/stuxnet/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier [hereinafter Stuxnet]. But see
John Markoff, A Code of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/weekinreview/03markoff.html?scp=6&sq
=stuxnet&st=cse (noting that it is unlikely that Israeli and U.S. governments
left such blatant clues, and the real authorship of Stuxnet is not likely to be
discovered) [hereinafter A Code of Chaos]. However, according to an article in
the New York Times in June 2012, Stuxnet was developed by the United
States and Israel to “slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts. David E.
Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
1,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-waveof-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?hp [hereinafter Cyberattacks Against Iran].
51. Times Topics: Iran’s Nuclear Program (Nuclear Talks 2012), N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/
nuclear_program/index.html?scp=3&sq=stuxnet,%20iran&st=cse [hereinafter
Iran’s Nuclear Program].
52. William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on
Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=all.
53. Stuxnet, supra note 50.
54. Id.
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Windows-based computers to a specialized system used for controlling industrial equipment, like electric power grids, manufacturing plants, gas pipelines, dams and power plants.”55 Previously, and in contrast, most types of cyberattacks focused on
extracting privileged information from websites and corporate
or military networks.56 Whoever created Stuxnet intended the
virus to go after industrial systems and specifically attack a
country’s critical infrastructure.57
Though the Iranian episode has passed, Stuxnet is still capable of wreaking havoc. Although Stuxnet is a technological
wonder and a proof of advancement in computer technology, it
is a weapon that poses significant danger to many nations’ critical infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the most frightening
part of Stuxnet is that the creator of Stuxnet spread the malware throughout the world.58 The Stuxnet code has appeared in
many countries, including China, India, Indonesia, and Iran,59
and it continues to spread at an alarming rate.60 Melissa Hathaway, a former U.S. National Cybersecurity Coordinator, stated that “[p]roliferation is a real problem, and no country is prepared to deal with it.”61 Another problem with Stuxnet is that it
is “highly visible,” meaning any government or cybersecurity
companies can dissect and examine the Stuxnet code.62 This is
dangerous because there is always a possibility of an attacker
creating different versions Stuxnet and launching new assaults. 63 In fact, in October 2011, a new Stuxnet-like virus

55. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50.
56. Id.
57. See A Silent Attack, supra note 13; see also William J. Broad & David
E. Sanger, Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
18,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/middleeast/19stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=all (In the case of Iranian nuclear facilities, experts determined that
Stuxnet “had been precisely calibrated in a way that would send nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control.”).
58. A Silent Attack, supra note 13 (exploring different theories on the reason behind the widespread of Stuxnet). It seems that an element of the Stuxnet program was released accidentally. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra
note 50.
59. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50.
60. A Silent Attack, supra note 13.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Stuxnet, supra note 50.
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called “Duqu” emerged, equally capable of threatening the security of a country’s critical infrastructure.64
Creating a virus or program that is as advanced and complex
as Stuxnet is not easy or cheap. Some have speculated that the
cost of creating Stuxnet was approximately $1 million and that
the virus was “sophisticated enough to have required backing
of one or more nation states.”65 In fact, an article from the New
York Times highlighted the difficulty that the United States
had in developing what later became known as Stuxnet until
there was a breakthrough aided by the Israeli government.66
This demonstrates that it is unlikely that non-state entities,
individuals, or less developed countries with limited technology
and resources have the ability to create a type of cyberattack
that is equally or more sophisticated and destructive than
Stuxnet.
Due to the emergence of Stuxnet, the world is now aware of a
type of cyberattack that can directly target a nation’s critical
infrastructure and bring about devastating effect. If there is a
successful cyberattack on a country’s oil pipelines, nuclear
plants, stock market, or water plants, it can have a devastating
effect on the country’s entire population. Thus, it is imperative
that the international community quickly creates a method to
effectively address and prevent such a cyberattack on national
critical infrastructure.
II. THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM
The attribution problem is the source of much of the challenges of regulating cyberspace.67 Simply put, cyberspace provides a platform where one can engage in activity anonymously.68 Anonymity can create problems even at the most basic lev64. John Markoff, New Malicious Program by Creators of Stuxnet Is SusTIMES
(Oct.
18,
2011),
pected,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/technology/stuxnet-computer-wormscreators-may-be-active-again.html [hereinafter New Stuxnet].
65. Ben Flanagan, Former CIA Chief Speaks out on Iran Stuxnet Attack,
(Dec.
15,
2011),
NAT’L
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industryinsights/technology/former-cia-chief-speaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack (noting that it cost approximately $1 million to create the Stuxnet virus).
66. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 50.
67. For an in-depth discussion of attribution issues, see Clark & Landau,
supra note 24, at 531.
68. Hollis, supra note 21, at 397.
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el of the Internet use. For example, the anonymous aspect of
the Internet has enabled schoolchildren to engage in cyberbullying, a label for online activities of teasing, harassing, or abusing others.69 When dealing with normal Internet uses, government agencies and police can often track down the person who
posted such comments through an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address with the assistance of an Internet Service Provider.70
However, IP address tracing has many flaws.71 An IP address
may be a corporate account that actually holds numerous internal accounts or may lead to a physical location that provides
free access to the general public, such as a coffee shop.72 Even
when an IP address leads to the original machine that initiated
a cyberattack, it may be a computer corrupted with a virus. Using a virus in this way, an attacker can launch a cyberattack
remotely from the corrupted computer, thereby concealing his
actual identity.73 In fact, many computers in the United States
are infected with viruses without the knowledge of the owners
or users, and an attacker can use these computers to remotely
launch attacks on other computers or networks.74 Additionally,
a skilled hacker can leave “false flag,” making an innocent entity seem responsible for a cyberattack.75
Even if some attacks are traceable, it takes much effort, expertise, and expense to track them. 76 When a government
agency or a security firm is successful in determining the origi69. See Times Topics: Cyberbullying, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cyberbullying/in
dex.html?scp=1&sq=cyber%20bullying&st=cse (“Its amorphous nature and
the rapidly changing technological landscape have made it difficult for
schools and even the courts to address the cyberbullying.”).
70. Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 545. If the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) keeps a good record of IP addresses that it assigns, then it can
trace which computer had an IP address that it assigned. However, since
ISPs regularly clear their IP address logs, a request to track the source must
happen quickly. Hollis, supra note 21, at 398–99.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 378.
74. Fredland, supra note 27, at 11 (citing Jack Goldsmith, Can We Stop the
POST
(Feb.
1,
2010),
Global
Cyber
Arms
Race?,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/31/AR2010013101834.html); Hollis, supra note
22, at 378.
75. Hollis, supra note 21, at 397.
76. See id. at 398–400; Condron, supra note 5, at 418.
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nal machine that initiated the attack, it still must identify the
person who launched it.77 Yet even if the computer user whose
activity sparked the cyberattack can be identified, the question
of who was actually behind the attack remains.78 An individual,
terrorist group, or even a nation state, could have launched the
cyberattack; 79 merely identifying the individual person who
used the machine that initiated the attack may not necessarily
unveil the actual entity behind the cyberattack.80 Pinpointing
the actual entity that originated the cyberattack is important
because the responsive action that a government can take will
differ based the nature of that identity.81
It is virtually impossible to track down the original entity behind a sophisticated cyberattack.82 Cybersecurity experts claim
that they will never know who was behind the creation of
Stuxnet and its launch on the Iranian nuclear facility.83 This
poses a problem in regulating cyberspace because without a
system that can catch and prosecute the perpetrator, it will be
difficult to deter cyberattack attempts. 84 Effective deterrence
comes from catching the perpetrator and rendering an appropriate punishment,85 but if one can remain anonymous and untraceable throughout a cyberattack, then there is no reason for
that entity to stop launching cyberattacks.86 Thus, the attribution problem becomes the main issue of any international
agreement attempt to regulate cyberattacks. Unless the basic

77. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 542–43, 547.
78. Condron, supra note 5, at 417.
79. Id. at 404; Shackelford, supra note 21, at 199–200.
80. See Toby L. Friesen, Resolving Tomorrow’s Conflicts Today: How New
Developments Within the U.N. Security Council Can Be Used to Combat
Cyberwarfare, 58 NAVAL L. REV. 89, 105 (2009); see also Hollis, supra note 21,
at 399–400.
81. Friesen, supra note 80, at 103.
82. Hollis, supra note 21, at 378.
83. A Code of Chaos, supra note 50.
84. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 25.
85. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 8–9.
86. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 17 (“As one might expect, current
international agreements that might be translated to cyber-warfare are presumed to concern relations among different nations, instead of individual
actors. Uncertainty still remains, therefore, in how the same law can be
translated to individuals, acting independently from any government, who
may engage in cyber-warfare.”).
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structure and architecture of the Internet changes,87 it will be
impossible to accurately trace back to the original entity every
time. However, thorough and stringent enforcement of criminal
law can minimize the attribution problem,88 and Part IV of this
Note will explain how the international agreement to use military force can compel countries to exercise their domestic law
enforcement to deter cyberattacks.
III. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT AND FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ADDRESSING CYBERATTACKS
ON NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Current International Treaty
The development in capabilities and sophistication of
cyberattacks led to a widespread call for an international treaty expanding to cyberattacks the current application of the law
of war.89 However, preexisting international treaties are inadequate to address and deter cyberattacks on a nation’s critical
infrastructure. The European Convention on Cybercrime treats
cyberattacks as only a criminal matter, rather than as a national security matter. Also, the current bodies of international
law, such as the Geneva Convention and the United Nations
Charter, primarily govern relations among nation states and
not non-state actors. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether the
issue of cyberattacks can fit into the legal regime of the current
international law.
1. The Convention on Cybercrime
In 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on
Cybercrime, the first international treaty addressing cyberat-

87. Although some scholars argue for the change in the very architecture
of the Internet, most scholars believe that such a change will not solve the
attribution problem. See Clark & Landau, supra note 24, at 533 (“Redesigning the Internet so that all actions can be robustly attributed to a person
would not help to deter the sophisticated attacks we are seeing today. At the
same time, such a change would raise numerous issues with respect to privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of action . . . .”).
88. See COLARIK, supra note 1, at 39; see also Christopher E. Lentz, A
State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L.
799, 820–22 (2010).
89. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 15.

2013] PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

811

tacks. 90 The Convention “requires parties to adjust their domestic criminal law to proscribe certain commonly defined offenses such as illegal access and data interference.”91 It also
requires member states to cooperate in investigating cybercrimes, to disclose digital evidence, and to prosecute cybercriminals.92 Currently, this is the only cyber-specific treaty, and so
far twenty-nine European states and the United States have
joined the Convention on Cybercrime.93
Although the Convention on Cybercrime tries to promote cooperation among member states to prosecute and deter cybercriminals, it has numerous flaws. First of all, it does not involve many key nations that are often at the center of cyberattack incidents and not even all of the European nations have
ratified it.94 Outside of the twenty-nine European states, the
United States is the only non-European nation to join the treaty.95 Second, the Convention on Cybercrime, as the title of the
treaty suggests, specifically focuses on criminal laws and criminal prosecution of cyberattackers.96 The purpose of the Convention is to effectively fight against cybercrime by “requir[ing]
increased, rapid and well-functioning international cooperation in criminal matters.”97 The Convention does not mention any situations involving cyberattacks initiated by a member state’s government or military. This poses a problem because if a cyberattack comes from a government agency or military, “neither domestic nor international rules regulating cy90. See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20.
91. Hollis, supra note 21, at 392; Convention on Cybercrime, supra note
20, art. 2–13.
92. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20, art. 14–35.
93. Id.
94. Id. Russia, a European nation that is often associated with both
cyberattacks and cybersecurity, did not join the treaty. Hollis, supra note 21,
at 393 n.124.
95. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20. Asian countries such as
China and South Korea have been heavily involved in cybersecurity incidents
and they have not joined the Convention on Cybersecurity. See Convention on
Cybercrime CETS No.: 185, Treaty Office, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&
DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
96. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20, at 169–70.
97. Id. (“The Present Convention is intended to . . . make criminal investigations and proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer
systems and data more effective and to enable the collection of evidence in
electronic form of a criminal offence.”).
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bercrime will apply.”98 Thus, a member state’s cyberattack upon another member state’s critical infrastructure will not fall
within the scope of the Convention on Cybercrime.
In addition, treating a cyberattack as a criminal matter does
not effectively address national security concerns deriving from
cyberattacks, generally. Criminal investigation requires a methodical process of gathering evidence.99 This can lead to a slow
and unsuccessful response to a cyberattack.100 Even if the Convention on Cybercrime is effective at increasing the speed of
criminal procedure, it does not guarantee that member states
will practice stringent criminal laws to oversee their cyberattack activities.101
2. The Geneva Convention and the U.N. Charter
Ambiguities in various provisions of current international
treaties and agreements create confusion and doubt as to
whether they encompass the issue of cyberattacks.102 Also, the
legal structures of current international law do not adequately
deal the increasing threat of cyberattacks. 103 Although some
scholars have broadly interpreted the law of war under the Geneva Convention to include cyberattacks,104 others have widely
criticized it as being inapplicable to address evolving forms of
cyberattacks.105 The Geneva Convention is a body of law that
deals with the law of war; however, Professor Duncan Hollis
argues that the existing legal system under the Geneva Convention suffers from

98. Hollis, supra note 21, at 393.
99. Condron, supra note 5, at 407.
100. Id.
101. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“When states fail to pass stringent criminal laws or look the other way when attackers strike rival states, criminal
laws are rendered impotent.”).
102. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 443.
103. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 16–17; see also Hollis, supra
note 21, at 405–06 (arguing not only that the current law’s response to cyberwarfare is insufficient, but it can also be dangerous; since it is not clear who
launched the cyberattack due to the attribution problem, a mistake in responding to a wrong, innocent target can be devastating).
104. National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
at 57, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nipp.pdf; see
also Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 16.
105. See id.
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several, near-fatal conditions: uncertainty (i.e., states lack a
clear picture of how to translate existing rules into the IO [information operations] environment); complexity (i.e., overlapping legal regimes threaten to overwhelm state decision makers seeking to apply IO); and insufficiency (i.e., the existing
rules fail to address the basic challenges of modern conflicts
with non-state actors and facilitate IO in appropriate circumstances).106

Scholars have argued that a cyberattack may constitute “use
of force” under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and are therefore already prohibited. 107 However, it is not clear whether a
cyberattack can fall within the scope of Article 2(4).108 There
are multiple possible interpretations of this provision,109 which
can create confusion and vagueness with regard to its precise
meaning.110 Traditionally, the extent of the meaning of Article
2(4) was narrowly focused on military violence.111 Although a
cyberattack on certain infrastructure can bear some similarities to physical military force, the issue of cyberattacks is a
new one—with unique and unpredictable characteristics—that
does not fall neatly into the category of military force.112
Furthermore, it is unclear whether a cyberattack can constitute an “armed attack” under the doctrine of self-defense pursuant to both Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.113 Scholars have argued that a nation can respond to a cyberattack with military force based on Article 51

106. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2007).
107. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see Waxman, supra note 8, at 427.
108. See id. at 431.
109. See Hollis, supra note 21, at 427–30 (offering three possible interpretations of “use of force” of the U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4): force as armed violence,
force as coercion, and force as interference); see also Waxman, supra note 8,
at 428–30 (discussing the possible meanings of “force” under U.N. Charter
2(4) as armed force, coercion, or interference).
110. See Oscar Schachter, The Rights of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (1984) (“The paragraph is complex in its structure[,]
and nearly all of its key terms raise questions of interpretation.”); see also
Hollis, supra note 21, at 427.
111. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 431.
112. See id.
113. See Condron, supra note 5, at 413; see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at
31–33 (providing an in-depth discussion on the subject of the self-defense
under the U.N. Charter, Article 51 and customary international law).
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of the U.N. Charter, 114 which provides that “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nation.”115 Also, under customary international law, a victim-state and its allies have authority to use
force in response to an armed attack. 116 However, the U.N.
Charter offers no definition of the meaning of “armed attack.”117 Although certain cyberattacks that are capable of inflicting physical damage will challenge the bounds of the meaning of “armed attack,”118 a cyberattack is often deemed to fall
short of “armed force.”119
Moreover, current international treaties apply only to relations among different nation states, and not individual nonstate actors.120 This is an important issue because the ability of
a nation to appropriately retaliate within an international legal
regime depends on what type of entity initiated the attack.121
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States and other countries have interpreted customary international law to allow “states to now treat the law of self-defense
as applicable to acts by non-state actors.”122 Nevertheless, it is
uncertain whether these international treaties can govern individual attackers who act independently of any government.123

114. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 427.
115. U.N. Charter art. 51. This provision serves as an exception to the general prohibition of use of force laid out in the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4).
116. See Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24
MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 529 (2003) (describing how a response under the selfdefense doctrine must comply with principles of customary international
law—necessity, proportionality, and imminency—discussed infra Part IV);
see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at 28 n.179 (“Unlike treaty-based law, which
only binds parties to the treaty, customary international law binds all states
to it. Customary international law is formed when state practice mature to
the point that it evidences opinio juris sive necessitates, a belief on the part of
states that engaging in that practice is legally obligatory.”).
117. WINGFIELD, supra note 2, at 78.
118. Waxman, supra note 8, at 431.
119. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 31.
120. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 17.
121. Id.
122. Schmitt, supra note 116, at 539; Sklerov, supra note 3, at 40.
123. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 17.
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B. The Difficulty of Establishing an Effective Future International Agreement on Cyberattacks
In order to address flaws and uncertainties regarding the
current international agreements, scholars and politicians have
called for a more effective international cyber-warfare treaty.124
However, it is unlikely that the international community will
establish such a treaty anytime soon.125 Unless there is a complete overhaul of the current structure of the Internet and cyberspace, the attribution problem will always exist.126 If a government cannot trace and prosecute the attacker, then any
such treaty will have no enforcement power.127
Moreover, Russia and the United States, two nations heavily
involved in the growing area of cyberattacks, are currently in
disagreement over an international treaty.128 In 1998, the Russian government proposed that U.N. member states form a
treaty to ban cyberweapons.129 Russia, concerned with increasing danger of military activities on civilian networks, argued
for its proposed treaty by comparing it to existing treaties regulating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 130 However,
the United States disagreed and argued that it is “impossible to
124. See id. at 19–20.
125. See id.; see also Adam Segal & Matthew Waxman, Why a Cybersecurity
is
a
Pipe
Dream,
CNN
(Oct.
27,
2011,
2:01
PM),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/27/why-a-cybersecuritytreaty-is-a-pipe-dream/?iref=allsearch (“Different interests among powerful
states—stemming from different strategic priorities, internal politics, publicprivate relationships and vulnerabilities—will continue to pull them apart on
how cyberspace should be used, regulated, and secured.”).
126. Hollis, supra note 21, at 398–99; Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 22.
127. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 22.
128. Id. at 19–20; Hollis, supra note 21, at 406–07; see Segal & Waxman,
supra note 125 (“With the United States and European democracies at one
end and China and Russia at another, states disagree sharply over such issues as whether international laws of war and self-defense should apply to
cyber attacks, the right to block information from citizens, and the roles that
private or quasi-private actors should play in Internet governance.”).
129. See U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 1st Comm., Letter dated 23 September
1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/53/3 (Sept. 30. 1998); see
also Hollis, supra note 21, at 406–07.
130. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia
TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2009),
on
Internet
Security,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/science/13cyber.html?scp=1&sq=u.s.%20t
alks%20to%20russia%20on%20web%20security&st=cse.
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draw a line between the commercial and military uses of hardware and software.”131 Instead, the United States called for increased cooperation among nations in opposing cybercrime and
stronger cybersecurity measures within each nation’s network.132
The United States’ position is understandable. The total banning of cyberattacks, made up entirely of computer codes, presents a difficulty in enforcement that is entirely different than
that of nuclear or chemical weapons.133 Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, hacking skills and hacking codes are available to
the general population throughout the world, and many entities can develop and obtain them without as much expense or
difficulty as a nuclear weapon would require.134 Also, any international treaty banning cyberweapons will limit the United
States’ position in cyberspace.135 The United States is continuously and consistently the target of a countless number of
cyberattacks, and the functionality of the country heavily depends on sophisticated and well-connected computer networks.136 Furthermore, about 80 percent of the global Internet
traffic passes through the United States. 137 Yet despite the
United States’ constant threat of suffering cyberattacks, the
nation still holds the premier position in cyberspace. Thus, the
United States is not likely to limit its available responses to a
cyberattack by agreeing to a total-ban treaty of any potential
cyberweapons.138
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT GRANTING AUTOMATIC LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO RESPOND WITH MILITARY ACTION
To effectively protect nations from a cyberattack, there must
be an international agreement (“Proposed Agreement” or
“Agreement”) that grants a member state the legal authority to
respond with a military action to a cyberattack to its critical
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Hollis, supra note 21, at 407.
134. Id.
135. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 26.
136. Friesen, supra note 80, at 97–98.
137. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 20, at 26.
138. Id. Also, the United States “will resist banning of cyberespionage [and
cyber exploitation, which] the international law currently tolerates.” Hollis,
supra note 21, at 407.
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infrastructure. The military response under the Proposed
Agreement will adhere to the customary international law
principles of necessity and proportionality. Since the threat of
cyberattack on a country’s critical infrastructure is real and
imminent, the international committee should view such an
attack as a threat to national security. Also, the Proposed
Agreement will minimize the attribution problem of cyberattacks to critical infrastructure by compelling member states to
exercise rigorous criminal law enforcement of cyberattacks.
The Proposed Agreement will create a strong incentive for nations, especially those that depend heavily on computer networks to operate their critical infrastructure, to join the
Agreement because it will prevent cyberattacks on their critical
infrastructure.
As for selecting or creating a body to pass the Proposed
Agreement, it makes sense that the U.N. should be in charge of
the task. The Proposed Agreement’s goal is to prevent a sophisticated cyberattack from seriously harming a country’s critical
infrastructure, which certainly falls within the scope of the
U.N.’s mission to “maintain[] international peace and security.”139 Additionally, the U.N. has 193 member states,140 and has
vast experience in passing international treaties and agreements.141 Therefore, the U.N. is an ideal body to effectively pass
and implement the Proposed Agreement.
A. Components of the Proposed Agreement
The Proposed Agreement should contain the following components: (1) a clear definition of what constitutes a nation
state’s critical infrastructure; 142 (2) a requirement that each
139. UN
at
Glance,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
NATIONS,
140. Member
States,
UNITED
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
141. See International Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/law
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
142. See supra text accompanying note 5. The United States of America
Patriot Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure as the “systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). Critical infrastructure
thus includes: “agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications,
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member state maintain a public list of existing critical infrastructure and give notice that such infrastructure is covered
and protected under the Agreement;143 (3) a confirmed attribution of a cyberattack that identifies the origin of the attack on
protected critical infrastructure of a member state; (4) automatic legal authority to respond with a military action against
the imputed member state from which the attack originated
absent further attribution; 144 and (5) a requirement that the
military response to the cyberattack meets the necessity and
proportionality requirement under the self-defense principle
pursuant to customary international law.145
Scholars argue that when the subject of a cyberattack is a nation’s critical infrastructure, the targeted nation should possess
a protected right to initiate a good-faith response to the attack.146 Still, the Proposed Agreement’s requirement of following the principles of existing customary international law will
prevent possible overreaction to a cyberattack. 147 Necessity exists when “self-defense is actually required under the circumstances because a reasonable settlement could not be attained
through peaceful means.” 148 Proportionality requires “selfdefense action to be limited to the amount of force necessary to
defeat an ongoing attack or to deter future aggression.”149
Imposing such a necessity requirement will restrain military
response such that it remains the option of last resort. Although the Proposed Agreement may not specifically mention
which type of cyberattack on critical infrastructure triggers a

energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.” See Condron, supra note 5, at 406–
07 (citing Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1816 (Dec. 17, 2003)).
143. See Condron, supra note 5, at 416.
144. See id.
145. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 28.
146. See Condron, supra note 5, at 415 (“To address the unique nature of
cyber warfare, international law should provide a safe harbor for states who
initiate a good-faith response to an attack.”); see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at
58–59 (“[W]hen a threat is considered urgent, such as an attack against [critical national infrastructure], the potential severity and imminence of the attack may be great enough to outweigh all other considerations.”).
147. See Condron, supra note 5, at 415–16; see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at
58.
148. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 32.
149. Id. at 32–33.
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military response, the necessity requirement will limit the victim-member state to military action only when the damage to
critical infrastructure is substantial. Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter states that a “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communications” is not a measure constituting
armed attack 150 and a cyberattack on critical infrastructure
does not necessarily result in loss of lives or massive property
damage 151 Thus, responding with military action when a
cyberattack does not result in substantial property damage or
loss of lives would be unreasonable under the context of the attack,152 and would violate the necessity principle.
If a cyberattack on a victim-member state’s critical infrastructure results in loss of lives or massive property damage,
then the military response must be proportional to the damage
inflicted by the cyberattack. Since a nation’s survival can very
well depend on the wellness of its critical infrastructure, the
nation may have to resort to “an immediate, robust, and aggressive response.” 153 In addition, under the proportionality
principle, the victim-member state can respond with force that
will have a deterrent effect, 154 and responding with military
action to a cyberattack resembling an armed attack would be
proportional.155 However, it would extend beyond the scope of
the proportionality requirement for the victim-nation to engage
in a full-on invasion when, for example, it suffered the destruction of a nuclear plant or a power outage that resulted in a
train crash.156

150. U.N. Charter art. 41.
151. See Susan Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare”, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 391–97
(2007) (noting that a cyberattack can result in “mass interference” or “mass
disruption” of a country’s communications or other infrastructure).
152. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 32.
153. See Condron, supra note 5, at 415.
154. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 32–33.
155. See Shackelford, supra note 21, at 236–39.
156. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 33.
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B. Remediating Failures of Existing Treaties
1. Cyberattack on National Critical Infrastructure as a National Security Matter
A successful cyberattack on a nation’s critical infrastructure
can have a devastating effect,157 and such an attack should be a
matter of national security rather than treated merely as a
criminal act. As evident in the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian
uranium enrichment plant, certain cyberattacks on national
critical infrastructure can inflict damage equivalent to physical
damage.158 Despite the gravity of such an attack, the United
States and other countries have always treated cyberattacks as
a criminal activity and not a national security matter.159 The
problem with treating a cyberattack as a criminal matter, especially when it targets a nation’s critical infrastructure, is
that doing so can result in a delayed response because investigation of a criminal act often requires a process of evidence
gathering, which could take potentially up to several months.160
Such delayed responses may result in lives lost, massive property damage,161 or both.

157. See Condron, supra note 5, at 407 (“Critical infrastructure is by definition essential for the survival of the nation.”); see also supra Part II.
158. See Brenner, supra note 151, at 390–91 (describing such a cyberattack
as a “weapon of mass destruction”).
159. See Condron, supra note 5, at 407; see also Convention on Cybercrime,
supra note 20, pmbl. (The Convention treats cybercrime as a criminal matter.). The White House’s Cybersecurity Proposal also seems to classify
cyberattacks as criminal matter. Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 17. See
Schmitd, supra note 18 (“The Administration proposal advances the security
of our increasingly “wired” critical infrastructure, strengthens the criminal
penalties for hacking into the systems that control these vital resources, and
clarifies the ability of companies and the government to voluntarily share
information about cybersecurity threats and incidents in a privacy-protective
manner.”).
160. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Computer National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 207, 232 (2002); see also Condron, supra note 5, at 407 (“Because law enforcement investigations that require the methodical collection of evidence
are often protracted and resource-intensive, typically taking days, weeks, or
even months, this presumption may result in a very slow response that may
come too late to confront a cyber attack successfully.”).
161. Condron, supra note 5, at 407.
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However, due to the increasing danger of cyberattacks,162 the
U.S. government has already taken a position that a cyberattack can constitute an act of war, triggering a military response
from the United States.163 Colonel David Lapan, the Director of
the Press Office at the Department of Defense, stated that “if
we are attacked we reserve the right to do any number of
things in response just like we do now with kinetic attack . . . .
So it makes the idea that attacks in cyber would be viewed in a
way that attacks in a kinetic form are now, the military option
is always a resort.”164 The U.S. government’s position on this
point reflects its view, framed within debate on the interpretation of “armed attack” under the U.N. Charter and customary
international law,165 that a cyberattack can elevate to the status of an armed attack.166
Any country that relies heavily on networked computer systems to control the country’s critical infrastructure must act
162. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War,
ST.
J.
(May
31,
2011),
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782
718.html (“Recent attacks on the Pentagon’s own systems—as well as the
sabotaging of Iran’s nuclear program via the Stuxnet computer worm—have
given new urgency to U.S. efforts to develop a more formalized approach to
cyber attacks.”).
163. Larry Shaughnessy, Pentagon Doesn’t Rule out Military Force Against
Cyberattacks, CNN (May 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0531/us/military.cyberattack_1_cyberattacks-military-force-militarycomputers?_s=PM:US. Colonel David Lapan said that if a cyberattack is serious enough, “a response to a cyberincident or attack on the U.S. would not
necessarily be a cyber response, so as I said all appropriate options would be
on the table.” Id. In May, 2011, the White House said “[w]e reserve the right
to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order
to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.” International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a NetHOUSE
14
(May
2011),
worked
World,
WHITE
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strate
gy_for_cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter International Strategy for Cyberspace].
164. Shaughnessy, supra note 163.
165. See supra Part III.3
166. See Sklerov, supra note 3, at 57 (citing Michael Schmitt, Computer
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a
Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 913-15 (1999)) (Lieutenant Commander Sklerov cites and discusses Schmitt’s explanation of six
criteria for evaluating cyberattacks as armed attack: severity, immediacy,
directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy).

822

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

immediately to protect itself in the face of the continuous and
ongoing danger of cyberattack, considering the ever-present
danger of one on a nation’s critical infrastructure. As noted
above, the threat of Stuxnet virus is far from being over, and
viruses that have the equal or more advanced capacity than
Stuxnet have emerged in cyberspace. 167 For example, federal
officials of the U.S. government are investigating a possible
cyberattack that occurred in November 2011 that caused a
shutdown of a public water pump in Illinois. 168 A dangerous
cyberattack such as Stuxnet, or any redesigned form of Stuxnet, can strike anytime on any country’s critical infrastructure
network.
Unlike the Convention on Cybercrime, 169 the Proposed
Agreement will treat a cyberattack on a nation’s critical infrastructure as a national security matter, and not a criminal
act.170 Doing so can overcome the faults of treating it as a criminal matter, including, specifically, the potential for a delayed
response by allowing for a response “nearly simultaneous with
the attack itself.”171 The Proposed Agreement should accelerate
the responding time to a cyberattack because it will not require
a process of evidence gathering, and its attribution requirement is only to the level of a member state, not a machine or an
individual attacker. Thus, the Proposed Agreement gives a
member state authority to instantly take action once its critical
infrastructure becomes the target of a cyberattack.
2. Criminal Law Enforcement and the Attribution Problem
Due to the attribution problem, a country planning to respond with military action will have difficulty trying to pinpoint the origin of a cyberattack; tracking down the country,

167. See supra Part II.
168. Mike M. Ahlers, Feds Investigating Illinois ‘Pump Failure’ as Possible
Cyber Attack, CNN (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/18/us/cyberattack-investigation/index.html?hpt=hp_t2 (“Such an attack would be noteworthy because, while cyber attacks on businesses are commonplace, attacks
that penetrate industrial control systems and intentionally destroy equipment are virtually unknown in the United States.”).
169. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 20.
170. See Condron, supra note 5, at 419.
171. Id. at 407–08; see also Sklerov, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that some
scholars believe that “it is too dangerous to waste time analyzing the attack
when [critical national infrastructure] is at risk”).
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entity, or machine responsible. 172 However, the Proposed
Agreement will not require the responding country to track
down the source of the attack to the exact machine or person of
origin. The Agreement has a narrow scope and it only applies
to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, meaning that the
cyberattack must be capable of infiltrating complex systems
and defensive mechanisms. Such sophisticated cyberattacks
most likely require advanced technology and government resources not readily available to a single individual or nongovernment affiliated group,173 which, for example, accounts for
the widespread attribution of the Stuxnet virus to the U.S. and
Israeli governments.174 Other examples abound: experts believe
that the Russian government was behind the cyberattack on
Estonia, and that either China or North Korea was behind the
cyberattack that targeted government websites in South Korea
and the United States.175 Thus, since cyberattacks in issue under the Proposed Agreement are likely to be launched by a government, the Agreement will require the responding state to
only find out which country launched the attack, not which
specific machine or person did so.
Nonetheless, the Proposed Agreement can seek to further
mitigate the attribution problem and any related misattribution by incentivizing each member state to prevent and regulate cyberattack activity within its borders. Although this Note
is skeptical of the efficacy of treating a cyberattack on critical
infrastructure as a criminal act, that skepticism is confined to
the problem of possible delayed police response. Properly enacted, the Proposed Agreement can incentivize member states
to prevent cyberattacks domestically by engaging in heavy preventative measures and strict local law enforcement. On the
one hand, rigorous and stringent criminal laws and law enforcement can have a deterring effect on cyberattack.176 On the
other hand, certainly, when “states fail to pass stringent crimi172. See Hollis, supra note 21, at 405–06.
173. See Gorman & Barnes, supra note 162 (“Pentagon officials believe the
most-sophisticated computer attacks require the resources of a government.
For instance, the weapons used in a major technological assault, such as taking down a power grid, would likely have been developed with state support,
Pentagon officials say.”).
174. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 50.
175. See supra Part I.A
176. See COLARIK, supra note 1, at 39.
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nal laws or look the other way when attackers strike rival
states, criminal laws are rendered impotent.”177 However, the
Proposed Agreement can force member states to increase their
effort to prevent and catch those who engage in cyberattacks
because a cyberattack originating within its borders can trigger
a military response from other member states. Each member
state will thus be more cautious and thorough in their effort to
regulate cyberattacks.
3. Why Join the Proposed Agreement?
The Proposed Agreement provides strong incentives for countries to join. It addresses increasingly dangerous threats of sophisticated cyberattacks on national critical infrastructure,
which have the potential to cause loss of life and property damage. 178 It provides an instant and efficient legal route to address a national security threat by granting an authorization to
respond with military action to a cyberattack.179 Moreover, the
Agreement minimizes the attribution problem by incentivizing
each member state to practice more rigorous law enforcement,
potentially resulting in an even greater degree of cyberattack
prevention.180
Of course there will still be shortcomings to the Agreement.
One major concern is that signing onto the Agreement will subject a member state to be the target of military force when a
cyberattack is determined to come from within its borders. This
will not likely be an appealing aspect of the Proposed Agreement and may possibly deter countries from joining it. Yet,
there are several reasons why this concern should not play a
large role in a nation’s decision to join the Agreement. First,
under the necessity and proportionality requirement pursuant
to component (5) of the Proposed Agreement, the threshold to
trigger military response is very high.181 Recall that under this
requirement, a cyberattack that does not cause loss of life or
massive property damage would not initiate a kinetic military

177. Sklerov, supra note 3, at 9. “Unfortunately, several major states[, such
as China and Russia,] refuse to take part in international efforts to eliminate
cyberattack and seem unlikely to do so in the near future.” Id.
178. See Shimeall, supra note 46, at 17.
179. See infra Part IV.B.1.
180. See supra Part IV.B.2.
181. See supra Part IV.A.
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reaction.182 Second, engaging in military action is not cheap,183
and countries are not likely to resort to military action unless
deemed necessary.184
Third, developed countries with significant military power
will have a greater incentive to join the Agreement because a
country that is more developed is likely to suffer more devastating impacts from a sophisticated cyberattack.185 Some states
are more dependent on computer networks, and a cyberattack
to such states’ critical infrastructure, compared to attacks on
less developed countries’ infrastructure, can have a larger and
more disastrous impact.186 Thus, member states will be more
reluctant to launch a cyberattack against, and risk military response from, more developed countries.
Yet, at the same time, this does not mean that smaller, less
developed countries are at a disadvantage by signing onto the
Agreement. 187 Critical infrastructure of less developed countries is not likely to be the target of a sophisticated cyberattack.
Since their infrastructure system does not rely heavily on cyber
networks to function, the impact of a cyberattack on their criti-

182. For example, authorizing military air strikes to destroy banking facilities in response to a cyberattack that infiltrated banking facilities and destroyed some of the financial system infrastructure would not meet the necessity and proportionality requirement. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 428.
183. For example, a week of military intervention in Libya during March
2011 cost the United States $600 million. See Z. Byron Wolf, Cost of Libya
Intervention $600 Million for First Week, Pentagon Says, ABC NEWS (Mar. 28,
2011, 6:50 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/cost-of-libyaintervention-600-million-for-first-week-pentagon-says (“One week after an
international military coalition intervention in Libya, the cost to U.S. taxpayers has reached at least $600 million, according figures provided by the
Pentagon . . . . And operation of the war craft, guzzling ever-expensive fuel to
maintain their positions off the Libyan coast and in the skies above, could
reach millions of dollars a week, experts say.”).
184. See Shaughnessy, supra note 163. Colonel David Lapan stated that
there is no clear threshold that would trigger a military action from the United States government in response to a cyberattack, but it would have to resemble a kinetic attack. Id.
185. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 455.
186. See id.; see also International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 163.
187. However, their involvement in the Agreement could prove to be irrelevant since the scope of the Proposed Agreement is very narrow and only deals
with cyberattacks on critical infrastructure that could cause kinetic force-like
damages.
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cal infrastructure is less likely to have a devastating effect.188
For example, a cyberattack on North Korea would not have
much effect on its critical infrastructure because its networked
system is very outdated compared to other developed countries
such as the United States or South Korea.189 Also, these less
developed countries are not likely to have resources or funding
to develop a cyberattack that is advanced and sophisticated
enough to effectively infiltrate other countries’ cyber defense
system and cause massive damage to their infrastructure.190 As
a result, it is not probable that their actions in cyberspace will
trigger military response under the Proposed Agreement and,
thus, they stand to gain more than they risk by signing on.
CONCLUSION
As technology advances, countries will only increase their dependence on cyber networks to operate their national infrastructure. The national critical infrastructure will continue to
be essential to governmental functions and to how people communicate, travel, obtain their necessities, and maintain their
safety and health. Thus, a successful cyberattack on national
critical infrastructure can cause an immense amount of damage, a threat that grows ever more dangerous due to increasing
sophistication of cyberattacks. Therefore, it is critical that the
international community respond promptly to meet the challenge of preventing such threats.
The Proposed Agreement provides an automatic authorization for injured member states to engage in military action in
response to a cyberattack on their critical infrastructure. The
Agreement remedies the flaws of the existing international
treaty framework and international law by treating cyberattacks as a national security matter, by offering an immediate
response to the danger of such an attack, and by minimizing
the attribution problem. Furthermore, the Agreement’s narrow
188. See Waxman, supra 8, at 455 (stating, “[Cyber] attacks could have a
disproportionately large impact on countries or militaries that have a higher
reliance on networked information systems.”).
189. Peter Apps, Analysis: Iran “Attack” Points to Rising Cyber Warfare
(Sept.
24,
2010,
2:14
PM),
Risk,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/24/us-security-cyber-warfareidUSTRE68N45Q20100924.
190. See Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 50; see also Flanagan, supra
note 65.
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scope will only govern cyberattacks on critical infrastructure
that will cause loss of lives or massive property damage while
its necessity and proportionality requirements will prevent
overreaction to a cyberattack. The Proposed Agreement will
offer incentives for countries to join so they can prevent
cyberattacks from causing disastrous damage to their government infrastructure and to their citizens.
We have a tendency to wait too long—until it is too late.
Technology advances and changes at an exponentially rapid
speed. And with that, greater risks are posed to national critical infrastructure from dangerous cyberattacks. Countries
around the world should act now and not wait until massive,
key infrastructures are destroyed or, worse, lives are lost.
Gabriel K. Park
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